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A Response to Professor Brian Leiter
Responding to Brian Leiter, Constitutional Law, Moral Judgment,
and the Supreme Court as Super-Legislature, 66 Hastings L.J. 1601
(2015).
Joseph R. Grodin
The editors of Hastings Law Journal have invited me to comment
on Professor Brian Leiter’s provocative essay, Constitutional Law, Moral
1
Judgment, and the Supreme Court as Super-Legislature, and I have
undertaken to do so, not so much because I disagree with what he says—in
fact, I agree with much of his thesis—but because what he says points to
questions which deserve further consideration.
That judges at the highest level, and in the adjudication of
constitutional issues, often disagree along what appear to be political or
ideological lines is no secret, even to the general public. Common parlance
often identifies certain judges as “conservative” or “liberal” in their leanings,
and while judges tend to resist such labels and seek to explain their
differences on other grounds, their explanations tend to be unconvincing.
For example, Chief Justice Roberts’ insistence in his confirmation hearing
that Supreme Court Justices are simply referees calling “balls” and “strikes”
appears ludicrous to anyone who has even a minimal understanding of the
2
appellate process.”
What is perhaps less well understood by the general public (but long
accepted by most constitutional scholars) is that the ambiguity or
malleability of decisional norms at the highest level makes such variations
not only predictable, but also, to some extent, acceptable, or at least
unavoidable. As Professor Leiter puts it, the constraints imposed by past
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decisions and by constitutional and legislative texts are
“underdetermin[ative],” so that the Court in many cases (Leiter would say
“most” cases) “essentially makes its final choice among the legally viable
3
options based on the moral and political values of the Justices.” It is this
aspect of decisionmaking that results in Leiter’s characterization of the
4
Supreme Court as “super-legislature.”
Yet calling the Supreme Court a super-legislature, with the
implication that its Justices, in their role as constitutional adjudicators,
are nothing but legislators with robes, is deeply disturbing to our
common notion of what we want judges to be; and it is, moreover,
contrary to how most judges perceive their role. Most judges, and I think
most legal scholars, would say that constitutional adjudication lies
somewhere in the middle of a continuum between the extremes of judgeas-referee and judge-as-legislator, and that judges believe (and we want
them to believe) that while moral and political values undoubtedly play a
role in constitutional decisionmaking, judges are constrained, in greater
or lesser degree, by a variety of factors, including constitutional text and
history, past decisions, their legal training, the opinions of their peers,
concern for the integrity of the Court as an institution, concern for the
maintenance of a rule of law, and concern for their own place in history.
These constraints account for cases in which judges of strong views find
themselves committed to results that, as legislators, they would have
abhorred, or which, as citizens, they find deeply offensive.
It is possible that judges to some extent deceive themselves and the
rest of us when they insist that their decisionmaking is constrained by
these factors, when in reality they are simply rationalizing their own
value preferences with the assistance of clever law clerks. Indeed, much of
modern psychology, from Freud to Kahneman, as well as contemporary
neuroscience, teaches that what we believe to be rational decisionmaking
may be heavily influenced, if not determined, by nonrational factors.
And we know from common experience that people typically act from
multiple motivations, some of which may not be fully recognized, and
which, in any event, resist independent evaluation. That being true, it is
virtually impossible for the judge or an observer to know with any degree
of confidence when or to what extent her decisionmaking is the product
of “objective” constraints or “subjective” value judgments. These
considerations support Professor Leiter’s suggestion that, in the
confirmation process for Supreme Court Justices, we should pay attention
to what we know or can learn about a nominee’s value systems. They also
suggest that the process ought not be reduced to such an inquiry.

3. Leiter, supra note 1, at 1601.
4. See id.
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We are living in a time of considerable cynicism about judges and
the judicial process, and some of it is justifiable. At the level of the U.S.
Supreme Court, a pattern of 5–4 decisions gives credence to the view that
something is going on beyond what is commonly understood as “the
law.” At the state level, judicial election campaigns backed by huge
amounts of money erode the very idea of an impartial judiciary. If we
really believed that high courts are nothing but super-legislatures, we
would do away with judicial review as anti-democratic, or at least we
would subject Supreme Court Justices to periodic retention elections, as is
done in many of the states for their state Supreme Court Justices. That we
do not do so (and Professor Leiter does not advocate that we do so)
suggests that most of us see value in a judiciary independent of the political
branches. But if we are to counter the simplistic pull of the judge-asreferee and judge-as-legislator metaphors that dominate most public
discussion at present, we need to find a way of talking about a middle
ground that does justice to the complex judicial task.
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